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Abstract: In this paper, we address the often contentious debate over state and local recycling
policy by carefully estimating the social net benefit of curbside recycling. Benefits are estimated
using household survey data from over 4,000 households across 40 western U.S. cities. We
calibrate household willingness-to-pay for hypothetical bias using an innovative experimental
design that contrasts stated and revealed preferences. Cost estimates are compiled from previous
studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Institute for Local Self Reliance,
and from in-depth interviews with recycling coordinators in our sampled cities. Across our
sample of cities, we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside recycling is
almost exactly zero. On a city-by-city basis, however, our social net-benefit analysis often
makes clear predictions about whether a curbside recycling program is an efficient use of
resources. Surprisingly, several curbside recycling programs in our sample appear to be
inefficient.
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1. Introduction
One of society’s greatest challenges is determining optimal allocations for environmental
goods, such as old-growth forests, wetlands, spotted owls, wolf habitat, clean air, etc. The
primary difficulty with this type of problem is accurately measuring the social benefits accruing
from the provision of these goods. Due to the potential for free-riding behavior and the absence
of well-developed markets, it is often necessary to estimate the benefits through non-market
valuation methods, such as contingent valuation.
In this paper, we focus on one such environmental good – curbside recycling. Recycling is
typically thought to benefit the environment by diverting solid waste from landfills, which can
pollute groundwater, produce airborne pollutants, and compete for open space [U.S. EPA, 1992].
However, recycling programs also require households to clean, sort, store and deliver
recyclables. Furthermore, curbside recycling programs (CRPs) divert resources from other
public services such as education, highway maintenance, welfare programs, etc. Our goal in this
paper is to provide a comprehensive measure of the social net benefit of curbside recycling, in
order to help answer the often contentious question: “Should we be recycling?”
To date, answers to this question have been contentious and, in some cases contradictory.
Take, for example, New York City’s decision in the summer of 2002 to temporarily suspend
collection of plastics and glass [Johnson, 2002]. Less than two years later, however, the city
completely reversed its decision, choosing instead to invest $20 million in a new Brooklyn
waterfront recycling plant [Urbina, 2004]. The primary basis for both the initial decision to
suspend recycling and the subsequent reversal of that decision was cost effectiveness. While
cost effectiveness may be an understandable criterion for municipalities that operate under tight
fiscal budgets and lack reliable estimates of the social benefits of recycling, we are left to wonder
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whether the city’s policymakers have made socially efficient decisions by failing to assess both
the social costs and benefits of curbside recycling.1
New York City is not alone. Recent trends suggest that recycling rates are falling
nationwide, provoking many communities to reconsider whether they should continue providing
curbside recycling. In its most recent annual report, “State of Garbage in America”, Biocycle
magazine finds that although the per-capita generation of solid waste continues to grow
nationwide, the overall recycling rate is down from 33 percent in 1999 to 26.7 percent in 2002
and the number of CRPs is similarly down from 9,709 to 8,875 [Kaufman, et al., 2004]. Cities
big and small have either dropped their CRPs completely or are scaling them back to meet
budget shortfalls [Seibert, 2002]. Also, several cities that have traditionally provided curbside
recycling without directly charging for the service are now considering levying a household fee
[Ibid]. Unfortunately, these decisions are being made similarly to New York City’s. They are
based exclusively on the criterion of cost effectiveness, rather than on the social net benefits of
curbside recycling.
This paper represents a first attempt at establishing a sound economic basis for making such
public policy decisions by estimating both the benefits and costs of curbside recycling for a wide
range of communities.2 One of our main contributions is the innovative way in which we use the
contingent valuation method (CVM) to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for CRPs. The
innovation stems from a common criticism of previous CVM studies – that respondents tend to
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We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that social efficiency is not the only issue driving the debate
about recycling. Questions related to the moral and ethical obligations of recycling are also likely at play.
2

Previous studies have also looked at the net benefits of curbside recycling (e.g., Hanley and Slark, 1994; SWANA,
1995; Kinnaman, 2000). However, these studies use more of a case-study approach focusing on individual
communities. We consider our study, which covers a wide variety of communities and CRPs, to be a complement to
and extension of these existing case studies. In particular, our study enables inference to a wider population of
CRPs.
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overstate their true WTP due to the hypothetical nature of the good. Unlike these previous
studies, we are able to estimate the magnitude of the potential hypothetical bias in our WTP data
by contrasting stated-preference information (from CVM) with revealed-preference information
(from actual decisions made by households in communities with voluntary CRPs).3 Using this
estimate of hypothetical bias, we then calibrate the corresponding WTP estimates to the
decisions made by households in a real market setting.4 To our knowledge, this is the first time
that stated- and revealed-preference information from the same dataset has been used to directly
estimate hypothetical bias in WTP and subsequently calibrate the welfare estimates.5
On the cost side, we utilize information from a wide array of communities to obtain an
estimated per-household economic cost of providing curbside recycling services. In calculating
the costs of curbside recycling, we include both explicit variable and fixed costs, as well as the
opportunity costs associated with diverting public resources away from their next most
productive use.
Across our sample of cities, we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside
recycling is almost exactly zero. However, on a city-by-city basis, our analysis often makes
clear predictions about whether a CRP is an efficient use of resources. The results from our
econometric and calibration exercise can also be used as a practical tool by local policy makers
to obtain estimates of their community’s WTP for curbside recycling. This is accomplished by
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“Voluntary” CRPs require households to pay only if they have signed up for the program while “mandatory” CRPs
require all households to pay, irrespective of whether they have signed up or not.
4

We use CVM to estimate benefits (rather than derive such measures using market prices and aggregate
participation levels) because much of the data from established markets for voluntary curbside recycling are
proprietary and also would not generally include information at the household level.
5

Cameron [1992], Adamowicz, et al. [1994], Huang, et al. [1997], and Whitehead, et al. [2000] combine stated and
revealed preference data to enhance the efficiency of their welfare estimates. Cummings and Taylor [1999] use
responses from stated- and revealed-preference laboratory experiments to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical
bias in students’ valuations of a series of public goods.
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substituting the relevant community and socio-demographic characteristics into the right-handside of our econometric equation. The resulting estimate of household benefits can then be
weighed against the economic costs to determine whether establishing or maintaining a CRP is
socially efficient.
The next section presents a simple theoretical framework that describes the management of
solid waste at the household and community levels. This framework guides our ensuing
empirical analysis. In section three, we introduce the data sources used in developing measures
of economic costs and benefits. In section four, we present our econometric model for
estimating WTP, including the methods used to mitigate hypothetical bias, and discuss our
empirical results. In section five, we discuss the policy implications of our empirical findings
and suggest some possible avenues for future research.

2. Theoretical Model
Our model involves an equilibrium relationship between households and a community
planner, whereby households make utility-maximizing decisions in response to the planner’s
policies and the planner sets public policy to maximize the well-being of the households. As
shown in the Appendix, household i, i = 1,…,n, is assumed to maximize an Andreoni (1990)
impure-public-good utility function by choosing recycling effort subject to a budget constraint.6
This creates a potential externality since households have no apparent incentive to fully
internalize the marginal effect of their private recycling effort on the aggregate amount of
recyclable material generated at the community level.7

6

The appendix can be found at www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/.
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See Fullerton and Wu [1998] and Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000] for alternative general equilibrium models of
recycling and other “green policies” at the household level.
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The impure-public-good assumption is supported by our survey results showing that both
ethics (i.e., “an ethical duty to help the environment”) and the potential generation of income
(through the sale of recyclable material to governmental or private entities) motivate many of the
sampled households to recycle. These two motivations suggest that households are indeed
motivated by what Andreoni has labeled the “egoistic” component of preferences. The
“altruistic” component of preferences is then represented by the potential for households to at
least partially internalize the effect of their private recycling effort on the community’s aggregate
amount of recycling.8
WTP for curbside recycling is ultimately derived by subtracting the household’s minimum
expenditure given that it participates in the CRP from its minimum expenditure given that it does
not. In other words, WTPi is defined by the amount of income household i would willingly
forego so as to participate in a CRP and maintain its original (pre-CRP) utility level. The
household’s WTP for curbside recycling may be negative if the disutility of foregone leisure is
sufficiently large relative to the utility gained from recycling.
The community planner is responsible for managing municipal solid waste G by (i) selecting
a type of CRP indexed by j ∈ {N,M,V}, where N, M and V refer to no, mandatory and
voluntary curbside recycling respectively; and (ii) selecting the household curbside recycling
fee, τ . The planner is assumed to face a balanced-budget constraint9

8

For an alternative interpretation of altruism and its effect on the efficient distribution of public goods, see
Bergstrom [1982], Jones-Lee [1991,1992], and Flores [2002].
9

We recognize that economic efficiency requires that households be serviced up to the point where price equals
marginal, rather than average, costs. We have chosen to focus on balance-budget pricing, however, for two reasons.
First, municipal CRPs are commonly expected to be self-sustaining and thus not dip continuously into general tax
revenues to cover costs (based on our own personal interviews of community recycling coordinators and private
contractors for this study). Note that for mandatory programs, where all households are required to pay for the
service, the CRP fee is simply a de facto form of lump-sum taxation and the natural fee is the one causing revenues
to just match total costs. Second, we observe several communities without mandated recycling goals choosing
mandatory CRPs. Since we know there are households with WTP less than marginal costs, this suggests an
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(1)

n jτ = C(n j , j)

where nj represents the number of participants for CRP type j and C is the total economic cost of
providing curbside recycling. The number of participants are nN = 0, nM = n, and nV = n*, where
n is the number of households participating in the mandatory CRP and n* is defined by the
number of households that satisfy WTPi ≥ τ under a voluntary program. C includes both explicit
fixed and variable components, as well as the implicit costs associated with the foregone use of
resources allocated toward a CRP (further discussion of these costs is provided in the next
section). Based on interviews with community recycling coordinators and private contractors
(discussed further in Section 3), we also assume that marginal cost (MC) is positive and constant
across nj. Thus, average total cost (ATC) is asymptotically coincident with MC.
The community planner then uses this benefit and cost information, along with budgetbalance condition (1), to simultaneously determine whether to establish a CRP, and if so, which
type and at what fee level. We begin by stating the condition required for the community
planner to offer a CRP of either type M or V.

CRP Condition I. Given (1) and WTPi, the community planner will offer a CRP of either
type M or V, if and only if

∑

n*
i =1

∑

M

n
i =1

WTPi ≥ C(n, M) ⇒ WTP ≥ ATC(n, M) or

V

M

V

WTPi ≥ C(n ∗ , V) ⇒ WTP ≥ ATC(n* , V) , where WTP and WTP denote the mean

WTP for mandatory and voluntary communities, respectively.

objective other than economic efficiency (e.g., a balanced-budget criterion). Nevertheless, implementing a
mandatory program in cases where the average household’s net benefit is positive is suggestive of a potential Pareto
improvement (with appropriate inter-household transfers), while implementing a voluntary program suggests an
actual Pareto improvement. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this last observation.
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In other words, the community planner will offer a CRP of either type M or V if the mean
WTP exceeds the ATC (evaluated at the number of participating households) for that program
type. Figure 1 depicts the geometry for CRP Condition I. The aggregate marginal surplus (AMS)
curve, drawn linear for simplification, depicts the change in aggregate WTP as the number of
households increases, beginning with the household with the largest WTP and ending with the
household whose WTP is lowest.
The household fee for the voluntary program, τV, is determined by budget balance at the
intersection between the AMS and ATC curves, which also determines the number of
participating households, n*, and the total net community surplus, area A. In this case, the
voluntary program passes CRP Condition I. A mandatory program charges a household fee of τM,
which by the budget-balance condition is consistent with n participating households. The
mandatory program also passes CRP Condition I if area A+B+C exceeds area F+G +H.
Conversely, both voluntary and mandatory programs would fail CRP Condition I if, for example,
the AMS curve lied everywhere beneath the ATC curve. In this case, no τ could be found to
satisfy (1), and thus a CRP of neither type would be offered.
If CRP Condition I is satisfied, the community planner then determines which type of
program to offer. The following condition gives the condition required for choosing a voluntary
or mandatory CRP.

CRP Condition II. Assume CRP Condition I is satisfied. The community planner chooses a
V

voluntary (mandatory) CRP if WTP − ATC(n* , V) is greater (less) than
M

WTP − ATC(n, M) with corresponding household fee τV (τM) satisfying (1).
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In other words, a voluntary program is chosen over a mandatory program whenever the
household fees and participation levels for the two programs are such that the net community
surplus from the voluntary program is greater than that from the mandatory program.
Figure 1 also depicts the geometry for CRP Condition II. Moving from a voluntary to a
mandatory CRP, n* households obtain a net-surplus increase of area B, while n – n* households
obtain a net-surplus change of area C – F – G – H. Therefore, if area B + C – F – G – H > 0, a
mandatory program is chosen under CRP Condition II with fee τM; otherwise a voluntary
program is chosen with fee τV. As shown in Figure 1, the probability that a voluntary CRP is
chosen increases, all else equal, as the ATC curve becomes flatter. A flatter ATC curve, in turn,
is consistent with a relatively low fixed-to-variable cost ratio. Alternatively, mandatory CRPs
have a greater probability of being chosen at higher fixed-to-variable cost ratios.
In closing, our joint household-community planner model makes clear predictions about the
social efficiency of various recycling options and enables us to predict which types of recycling
programs should be observed in the different communities in our sample. Before making these
predictions, however, we first introduce the data sources used to estimate the costs and benefits
of the various CRPs sampled from our population.

3. Cost and Benefit Data
3.1. Cost Data
Our CRP cost data was obtained from two sources: (i) interviews with community recycling
coordinators and private contractors located in our study area (discussed further in Section 3.2),
and (ii) published studies by the Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR) [1991] and Franklin
Associates, Ltd [1997]. The ILSR study provides detailed cost information for Seattle, WA and
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West Linn, OR, while the Franklin Associates study provides information for Olathe, KS. From
the recycling coordinators and private contractors, we obtained cost information for eight cities –
seven communities in our sample and Portland, OR.10 This information is shown in Table 1.
The costs are based on explicit fixed and variable expenses for collection and processing
incurred during the most recent year available. They are reported on a per-household per-month
basis in order to be directly comparable with our benefit information.11 The costs have also been
adjusted for cost-of-living differences across communities [MSN, 2003], and in the case of
Seattle, West Linn, and Olathe appropriate adjustments for inflation have been made using the
consumer price index [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003]. In addition to the CRP costs, Table 1
also includes information on the number of participating households per year, percentage of the
community’s population participating, as well as indicators for whether the CRP is mandatory
and whether household sorting of recyclables is required.
Several observations can be made from the information provided in Table 1. To begin, the
estimated mean monthly cost per household across the eleven communities equals $2.93, with a
coefficient of variation of 33 percent, implying a fairly tight distribution of cost estimates around
the mean. Second, because each CRP in our sample is different in terms of items collected,
collection frequency, whether it is a mandatory or voluntary program, degree of sorting required,
etc., we are unable to identify a single underlying ATC curve. As a result, the numbers from
Table 1 likely represent distinct points along several different ATC curves, rather than points
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Cost information was unavailable for many of our sampled communities because it does not exist, cannot be
extracted from overall waste-disposal cost information, or is proprietary.
11

Costs are reported as an average cost over the lifetime of the program. This reflects the fact that recycling
coordinators and contractors are generally required to report on an annual basis and that CRPs are generally
associated with relatively long planning horizons (e.g., 10-20 years) over which up-front capital costs are spread. As
a result, we do not attempt to calculate net present value estimates based on the specific periods in which the costs
are incurred. Rather, we presume that the monthly cost estimates provided by the recycling coordinators accurately
reflect what a community can expect to incur during any given month of any given year.
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along a single curve. Lastly, there seems to be a weak relationship between costs and whether
the CRP is mandatory or voluntary. Five of the six least-costly CRPs are voluntary. This cost
differential is apparently due to unobservable cost efficiencies rather than economies-of-scale
effects.12

3.2. Survey Data and Design
Turning to the benefit data, we conducted a random-digit dialed telephone survey regarding
recycling behavior during the winter of 2002 to over 4,000 households in 40 western U.S. cities
with populations over 50,000.13 We chose an approximately even three-way split between
communities with a voluntary, a mandatory and no CRP. We purposefully over-sampled
households in communities with voluntary CRPs to allow for the detection of any hypothetical
bias in the data. To supplement the household data, we also conducted a telephone survey of the
recycling coordinators (i.e., the public and private officials responsible for recycling services) in
each of the 40 cities in order to provide specific information on the attributes and history of
recycling in their respective communities.

12

Unobservable cost efficiencies may be related to the facts that (i) Seattle and West Linn were included in the
ILSR [1991] study of the nation's most efficient CRPs, and (ii) recycling coordinators for the cities of Tempe, Fargo,
Orem, and Portland were able to provide relatively detailed information about their respective programs. These
facts suggest that these six programs may be more efficiently managed than the average program in our sample.
13

Due to budget limitations, our population does not include the eastern U.S. The survey was administered by the
survey research laboratory at Washington State University. The response and cooperation rates were 27 percent and
49 percent, respectively. The survey instrument, a list of the 40 cities in our sample, and information on the
calculation of the response and cooperation rates are available at
www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/datareport.pdf.
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4. Econometric Methodology and WTP Estimates
In this section, we discuss (i) the double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) model used
to obtain our welfare estimates, (ii) the estimation results for overall WTP, (iii) the identification
and estimation of hypothetical bias across the different program types (i.e., M, V, and N), and
(iv) the calibration of the mean WTP estimates for a select group of cities.

4.1. Econometric Model
Our econometric approach follows Cameron and James [1987]. WTP questions are set in the
DBDC format to elicit a household’s WTP through a sequence of dichotomous-choice
questions.14 The first question is: “Would you be willing to pay $ν for the service?” The
opening bid ν is chosen randomly from a set of predetermined values.15 Based on her response
to the opening bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up question, but with a larger
bid value, 2ν, if she answered “yes” (i.e., she is willing to pay at least ν for the service) or a
smaller bid, 0.5ν, if she answered “no” (i.e., she is unwilling to pay ν for the service).
Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up questions, the respondent’s latent
WTP may be placed in one of four regions: (-∞,0.5ν), (0.5ν, ν), (ν, 2ν) or (2ν, ∞). Unlike other
CVM studies, we follow up with a third valuation question for those who respond “no” to the
first two valuation questions: “Would you be willing to use the service if it were free of
charge?” Previous experience with household recycling surveys suggests that some households
have negative WTP values, or in other words need to be paid to participate in a CRP [Haab and
14

The issue of optimal bid design is beyond the scope of this paper. For further discussion on bid design see
Kanninen [1995] and Cameron, et al. [2002].
15

The opening bids are chosen with equal probabilities from the set of integers two through 10. This set
encompasses the range of household fees charged by the communities in our sample. As with the CRP cost data, the
bids are adjusted so that our estimates of social net benefits accurately reflect real differences in cost-of-living across
the communities in our sample.
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McConnell, 1997; Aadland and Caplan, 2003]. As a result, our survey generates five rather than
four valuation regions with (-∞,0.5ν) being replaced by (-∞, 0) and (0, 0.5ν).16
Households currently participating in their community’s CRP were asked to value their
existing program, while those households located in a community without a CRP were described
the following hypothetical program,17
“……please imagine that you could have a curbside-recycling service that regularly
collects aluminum cans, cardboard, glass, paper, plastic, and tin cans. Your household
would/would not need to sort your recyclables into separate bins and would be required to
pay a fee for the recycling service, in addition to your current monthly garbage collection
fee. Now we are going to ask you some questions about your household's willingness to pay
for this type of curbside recycling service.”
This description was developed with input from the recycling coordinators. According to the
coordinators, the primary factor distinguishing one CRP from another at the household level is
the degree to which the household is required to sort its recyclable material, not the specific
materials which are ultimately collected. By varying this description randomly across
households – based on whether the household “would” or “would not” need to sort their
recyclables – we are therefore able to make direct comparisons between WTP responses elicited
for this hypothetical CRP and responses elicited for existing voluntary and mandatory CRPs.
These responses, in turn, enable us to measure the magnitude of hypothetical bias in WTP
estimates (discussed at length in Section 4.3).18
16

Some respondents answered “Don’t Know” to one or more of the valuation questions. For these households, their
unknown WTP does not fit into one of the five categories, but instead overlaps one or more of the intervals. For
example, if a respondent answered “Don’t Know” to whether they would be willing to pay $ν and “Yes” to whether
they would be willing to pay $0.5ν, we assume that their unknown WTP falls in the region (0.5ν, ∞). The likelihood
function is adjusted accordingly.
17

Households located in communities with an existing CRP, and who know that the CRP exists, but who have
chosen not to participate in the program were asked to value their community's existing program. Households
located in communities with an existing CRP, but who are unaware that the program exists, were asked to value the
hypothetical program described in quotations below.
18

For further information on our survey design see Aadland and Caplan [2005]. A copy of the survey instrument is
available at www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle.

14

Turning to our econometric model, we specify a reduced-form version of WTPi, where the
vector of explanatory variables Xi includes a host of household- and community-specific
characteristics. A normally distributed random error term εi is added to capture the portion of
WTPi unexplained by Xi, implying

WTPi = Xiβ + εi ,

(2)

where β is a vector of coefficients. The variance of the error terms is assumed to follow

σi2 = exp(Zi γ ) ,

(3)

where Zi is a vector of variables and γ is a vector of parameters. Using (2) and (3), we then form
and maximize the log likelihood function (see Aadland and Caplan [2003] for additional details
on the specification of the probabilities and likelihood function). The definitions of the
explanatory variables used in equations (2) and (3), along with their sample means, are provided
in Table 2.

4.2. Econometric Results
In columns two and three of Table 3, we report our DBDC estimates across all (N = 4012)
households in our sample. First, note that the estimated WTP, averaged across cities, is $5.61
per month.19 This estimate is larger than those reported in Aadland and Caplan [1999] and Tiller
et al. [1997]; approximately the same as in Lake et al. [1996], Caplan and Grijalva [2003], and

19

We have also tested for possible incentive incompatibility and starting-point bias using an approach originally
suggested by Whitehead [2002] and later modified by Aadland and Caplan [2004]. We find evidence of startingpoint bias but no incentive incompatibility. The mean WTP estimates for the two models (one controlling for
starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility and one not) are very similar. As a result, we report the results
from the latter model. The results from the former model are available from the authors upon request.
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Caplan et al. [2003]; but smaller than those in Aadland and Caplan [2003], Kinnaman [2000],
and Jakus et al. [1996].20
Second, we find several individual- and community-specific characteristics that are
significantly related to WTP for curbside recycling. To highlight a few, those willing to pay the
most are (a) young; (b) female; (c) highly educated; (d) motivated to recycle because of an
ethical duty to help the environment; (e) members of an environmental organization; and
(f) rated their current CRP as good or excellent. Many of these effects are similar to those found
in the previously cited literature. The likelihood ratio test indicates that a significant amount of
the variation in WTP being explained by household, community, and program attributes.
Third, we test for heteroscedasticity using (3). By construction of the bid design, BID is
systematically related to the variance of the latent WTP errors. Recall that the opening bids are
even integers between two and 10, with subsequent bids equal to either half or twice the opening
amount. Therefore, the bid design generates larger WTP intervals (and thus more uncertainty
regarding the true WTP) for higher opening bids. As expected, the coefficient on BID is positive
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

4.3. Calibrating WTP for Hypothetical Bias
The potential for hypothetical bias arises whenever people are asked to provide a maximum
amount they are willing to pay for a good or service, even though they will not have to actually
pay for it [e.g., Hanemann, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1994]. We estimate the magnitude of
the bias in each of our community types – voluntary, mandatory and no CRP – and calibrate the
mean WTP estimates accordingly. In CVM it is typically not possible to estimate the magnitude

20

Tiller et al. [1997] and Jakus et al. [1996] are concerned with dropoff (as opposed to curbside) recycling
programs.
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of hypothetical bias because the good under question is not typically traded in an established
market. Even if the good is traded in an established market, one needs sufficient variation in the
price of both the hypothetical and actual goods. With this in mind, our experiment was designed
to include two different groups (one making stated decisions and the other making revealed
decisions) and price variation across both hypothetical and actual CRPs. This feature of our data
enables us to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias for each of our community types. We
begin with voluntary CRP communities.

4.3.1. Estimating Hypothetical Bias: Communities with Voluntary CRPs
We first extract two non-overlapping subsamples of households from the dataset: (i)
households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that made a hypothetical decision
about whether to participate in their existing CRP at a randomly assigned initial bid and (ii)
households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that have made an actual decision
about whether to participate in their existing CRP. Households in the second subsample (N =
538) have revealed their preferences for curbside recycling, while households in the first
subsample (N = 630) are simply stating their preferences for curbside recycling. The subsample
of stated-preference households was restricted to those whose initial (cost-of-living adjusted)
bids were between $1.30 and $4.94 per month in order to be directly comparable with the
existing fees faced by the revealed-preference households.
Next, we pool these two groups together and estimate a probit model for the decision of
whether to participate in a voluntary CRP, controlling for a host of household, program, and
community attributes. We also allow the error variances to differ according to whether
households are stating or revealing their preferences [Adamowicz et al., 1994]. Our null

17

hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing the statistical significance of the
coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation decision is hypothetical or real.
If this coefficient is positive and statistically significant, we conclude that the typical household
in a community with a voluntary CRP will, all else equal, tend to overstate their WTP for
curbside recycling by the value of the coefficient. The estimation results for this model, shown
in columns four and five of Table 3, indicate that hypothetical bias for households in voluntary
CRP communities is $2.30 per month.21

4.3.2. Estimating Hypothetical Bias: Communities with a Mandatory or No CRP
Next, we estimate hypothetical bias for households residing in communities with either a
mandatory or no CRP, using methods similar to those described above. In this case, the
revealed-preference group includes all households residing in voluntary CRP communities with
existing (cost-of-living-adjusted) fees between $1.30 and $4.94 per month and that are aware of
the program’s existence, irrespective of the initial bid that they received (N = 994).22
There are two stated-preference groups in this case – those making hypothetical decisions
about their mandatory CRP (N = 332) and those in communities without a CRP who are deciding
about a hypothetical CRP described in the survey (N = 788). We then pool all three groups – the
revealed-preference voluntary CRP group, the mandatory CRP group, and the hypothetical CRP
group – and estimate a probit model to predict whether a household participates in a CRP. As
before, we control for a wide variety of household, program and community attributes, and we
allow error variances to differ by CRP type and whether the households are stating or revealing
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For more details about this method of detecting and estimating the magnitude of hypothetical bias see Aadland
and Caplan [2005].
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their preferences. Two variables of most interest are the binary ones for whether the statedpreference households are located in a community with either a mandatory or no CRP. If the
coefficients on these dummy variables are positive and statistically significant, we interpret this
as evidence of positive hypothetical bias. In other words, when faced with the decision of
whether to sign up for a CRP, all else equal, households located in a mandatory or no CRP
community that are making a hypothetical decision are more likely to do so (and consequently
have a higher latent WTP) than those making an actual decision.
The results from this experiment, shown in columns six and seven of Table 3, indicate that
hypothetical bias among households in mandatory and no CRP communities is $2.72 and $2.96
per month, respectively. As anticipated, the bias estimate for the typical household in a
mandatory CRP community is lower (albeit slightly) than that for the no-CRP community, and
both of these estimates are higher than that for the typical household in a voluntary CRP
community. This ordering suggests that the experience associated with voluntarily signing up
for and/or using a CRP enables households to more accurately determine their true WTP.

4.3.3. Calibrated WTP
Using the hypothetical bias estimates from the previous two sections, we can adjust the mean
WTP estimates, conditional on whether the household resides in a voluntary, mandatory, or no
CRP community. Also, using city-level U.S. Census Bureau data [2000] we are able to adjust
the estimates to better represent population demographics. Making adjustments for hypothetical
bias and sampling error, we find that the average calibrated WTP value across the 40
communities in our sample is $2.97 (see bottom of Table 3). Table 4 provides additional details

22

We estimate hypothetical bias for the mandatory and no CRP households separately from the bias in the voluntary
CRP households because the revealed-preference group in this section is larger than that in Section 4.3.1.

19

on the calibration process for the nine cities in our sample with available cost data and three
randomly selected non-CRP cities. In terms of estimated WTP, these 12 cities are representative
of our sample of 40 cities and highlight the diversity across communities. It is interesting to note
that the estimated average monthly benefits per household from curbside recycling range from a
high of over $5 in Tempe, AZ to a low of $1.40 in Newport Beach, CA.

5. Policy Analysis and Conclusions
Remarkably, by comparing our mean calibrated WTP and cost estimates, we conclude that
the social net benefit of curbside recycling is almost exactly zero. As a result, to determine
whether it is an efficient use of society’s resources, we need to evaluate curbside recycling on a
city-by-city basis.
In Table 5, we take a closer look at the 12 communities included in Table 4. Calibrated WTP
values from Table 4 and per-household costs from Table 1 are provided in columns 2 and 3.
Column 4 presents the corresponding social net benefits of curbside recycling, which vary
greatly across the 12 communities. For example, monthly net benefits in Tempe, AZ are $3.50
per household, while in Palo Alto, CA they are -$2.85. At their current populations and rates of
CRP participation, this amounts to an annualized net benefit gain of $1.5 million in Tempe and
an annualized net benefit loss in Palo Alto of $1.0 million.
To shed some light on the variation in community net benefits noted above, we dig deeper
into the two communities located on opposite ends of the net-benefit spectrum – Tempe, AZ
(high end) and Palo Alto, CA (low end). As indicated by the information contained in columns
two and three of Table 5, the net-benefit difference between these two communities is due to
differences in both the costs and benefits of curbside recycling. On the benefits side, Tempe has
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a nearly $3 higher adjusted benefit per household than Palo Alto. The majority of this difference
is unexplained variation captured by our city dummy variable, while the remainder appears to be
due to the fact that, all else equal, Tempe has a younger population, higher employment rate, and
respondents were less likely to give refusals on the first call attempt.23
Although we can only conjecture on what may be driving the unexplained difference in WTP
across the two communities, one possibility is the residents’ perceptions regarding landfill
constraints. For example, Tempe is more actively informing residents of landfill issues than is
Palo Alto. The Tempe Public Works Department (2006) writes on their website: “One thing is
certain, in the next few years Tempe’s residents and businesses will need to get involved in
recycling if we are to solve the municipal solid waste problem.” This, in turn, could help to raise
the value of alternatives to landfilling waste (such as curbside or dropoff recycling) for the
typical Tempe resident.24
On the cost side, Palo Alto’s CRP costs approximately $3.50 more per household to operate
than Tempe’s program. The higher costs for Palo Alto appear to be driven by additional labor
expense (due to the use of multiple bins rather than a single, automated co-mingled container)
and relatively weaker enforcement of recycling standards (which may ultimately impact the
quality of the recyclables collected). The problem with additional labor expense was noted by
Brown, Vence, and Associates, Inc.(2001) in their final report to the Palo Alto Public Works
Department, which suggested that the city’s recycling collection process was inefficient (pages
2-9 and 2-10). Palo Alto subsequently switched from separate bin collection to their current comingled system, shortly after we completed our survey in the winter of 2002. To the contrary,
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The community dummy variables for Tempe and Palo Alto (not shown in Table 3) account for $2.15, or more
than two-thirds of the total difference in WTP across these two cities.
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Tempe’s decade-old approach of dividing the collection and processing components of its comingled system between the city and a private company appears to have significantly reduced
the costs associated with both components.
The last two columns of Table 5 compare existing CRPs with our theoretical/empirical
predictions. The column entitled “CRP Predictions” shows that five of the 12 communities
satisfy CRP Condition I (i.e., social net benefits of curbside recycling are positive). Of these
five, two communities have mandatory CRPs (Tempe, AZ and Longmont, CO), while the
remaining three have voluntary CRPs. CRP Condition II predicts that Tempe and Longmont
may have mandatory CRPs because of high fixed-to-variable cost ratios (relative to Orem,
Wichita and Fargo). Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis since we were unable to
obtain a breakdown of the fixed and variable cost information from the recycling coordinators in
Tempe and Longmont.
Of the seven communities that we predict should not have a CRP, three (Abilene, Peoria and
Inglewood) represent correct predictions and four (Escondido, Olathe, Newport Beach and Palo
Alto) do not. The most probable explanation for why Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto
have chosen mandatory CRPs (when our estimates suggest that their social net benefits are
clearly negative) is that California has implemented a state-mandated recycling quota. Which
naturally provokes the question: In the 20 or so states that have passed laws establishing
mandatory recycling programs or quotas, how many communities are motivated by the recycling
targets themselves rather than by locally-based economic rationalizations?
In sum, using our theoretical model and estimates of net social benefits, we have correctly
predicted the choice of whether or not to implement a CRP for 8 of the 12 selected communities.
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The recycling websites for Tempe and Palo Alto are www.tempe.gov/publicworks/fspage/curbside/crecycling.htm
and www.cityofpaloalto.org/public-works/rec-index.html, respectively.
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Furthermore, if Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto have in fact chosen mandatory CRPs
in order to meet a state-mandated recycling quota, then we can explain all but one community’s
(Olathe, KS) choice of whether or not to provide a CRP.
Next, we highlight the main shortcomings of our approach. On the one hand, our mean WTP
estimates may understate the social benefit of recycling if survey respondents are not fully
internalizing the public benefits associated with recycling. As mentioned in Section 2, we have
assumed that households are “impurely altruistic”, in the sense that although they are motivated
to recycle out of an “ethical responsibility to help the environment,” they may not be fully
internalizing the effects of their recycling effort on the welfare of other households located in
their community. To the extent that each household values increased aggregate recycling, this
may cause us to understate the social net benefit of recycling.
On the other hand, it is possible that we may be overstating the net benefits of curbside
recycling. The issue of how to account for implicit opportunity costs through discounting is
hotly debated [Hanley and Spash, 1993]. We have tacitly assumed that the opportunity cost
associated with diverting resources toward curbside recycling is the foregone interest income at
the market interest rate, which in turn is assumed to equal the social discount rate. As a result,
discounting completely offsets any accumulated opportunity costs. To the degree that the market
interest rate (or rate of return on the next best alternative) exceeds the social discount rate, the
social net benefit of recycling will be overstated.
In sum, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, this is the most comprehensive study todate of the social efficiency of curbside recycling. The study covers approximately 20 western
U.S. states, surveying over 4,000 households and recycling coordinators in 40 different
communities. The benefit measure generated from the household survey is carefully calibrated
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for hypothetical bias by contrasting with the actual decisions of households residing in
communities with voluntary CRPs. The economic cost of providing curbside recycling services
is estimated from direct interviews with the recycling coordinators from cities within our sample
and from previous research compiled by the U.S. EPA and ISLR. Remarkably, we find that, on
average, the benefits and costs per household are almost exactly identical.
Although this finding lends scientific credibility to an often contentious national recycling
debate, it does little to guide national opinion regarding the efficiency of municipal recycling
programs. At a local level, however, our research suggests that the public policy choices are
often much more clear. Cities with significantly positive net social benefits should be supporting
curbside recycling programs while cities with significantly negative net social benefits should
consider other waste management options. Toward that end, our research provides local
policymakers within our population of western U.S. states the additional tools necessary to
decide whether to implement or maintain a CRP. Local policymakers can obtain WTP estimates
for their respective communities by substituting community and socio-demographic
characteristics into the right-hand-side of our econometric equation (i.e., equation (2)). Or, they
might consider conducting their own surveys, in which case our survey design and econometric
analysis might serve as a useful benchmark. Finally, regardless of how they estimate the benefits
associated with curbside recycling, policymakers in communities with existing CRPs should
maintain detailed cost information for their programs, preferably disaggregated from general
refuse funds, as is currently done in the cities of Portland, OR and Seattle, WA.
A natural next step would be to extend our research to the eastern U.S. where the constraints
on landfill space are more binding, and to obtain more precise CRP cost data across a wider
variety of communities. To accomplish this, more case studies of existing CRPs are required
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(along the lines of ILSR, 1991; U.S. EPA, 1994; Hanley and Slark, 1994; SWANA, 1995;
Franklin Associates, Ltd., 1997; and Kinnaman, 2000). This would enable us to more accurately
estimate the marginal and average costs of providing curbside recycling and to identify programs
that are the most cost effective.
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Figure 1. CRP Conditions I and II.
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Table 1. Costs per Household and Other Characteristics for CRPs
Cost ($) per Number of
Percent of
Mandatory
City
Household Households Households
Program?
h
per Month Participating Participating
Tempe, AZ
1.62
38,000
60
Yes
e
Seattle, WA
1.71
113,484
44
No
West Linn, ORe
2.21
4,956
61
No
Fargo, ND
2.68
1,452
4
No
Orem, UT
2.78b
5,400
23
No
c
Portland, OR
2.89
139,431
62
Yes
Longmont, CO
3.03g
22,950
86
Yes
Escondido, CA
3.16b
NA
NA
Yes
Newport Beach, CA
3.42
27,700
84
Yes
Olathe, KSa
3.58b
30,000
93
No
d
Palo Alto, CA
5.10
25,216
100
Yes
Mean
2.93
40,859
61.7
--Coefficient of Var.
0.33
1.15
0.50
---

Household
Sorting
Required?
No
Nof
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
-----

Notes. aBased on figures provided by Franklin Associates, Ltd., “Solid Waste Management at the Crossroads,”
December 1997. bSince the revenues from the sale of recyclable materials were unavailable, we used the average
revenue (adjusted for location) across communities that reported revenue sales. This amounted to $0.44 per
household per month. cBased on figures provided by Neal Johnson, Recycling Coordinator, December 2002.
d
Includes once-a-month curbside collection of household hazardous waste and green waste. eBased on figures
provided by ILSR [1991]. fApproximately 56 percent of households (those located in the “north section” of the
city) participate a commingled program, while the remaining 44 percent (located in the “south section”)
participate in a non-sorting program. gProcessing costs are inferred using Franklin Associates, Ltd. [1997] at
$1.53 per household per month (after adjusting for location and inflation). hLess than 100% participation in
mandatory CRPs is common, since even though households are required to pay for the program they are typically
under no obligation to actually participate. NA means “not available”.
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Table 2. Variable Definitions and Means
Variables
Mean

Description

0.87
Ethical Duty
Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
0.47
Monetary
Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money? 1= yes, 0 = no.
0.56
Primarily Ethics
Which most encourages your household to recycle? 1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money.
1.31
Dropoff Distance
Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site.
0.61
Dropoff User
In the past 12 months has your household used dropoff recycling? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
0.32
Young
1 if 18<Age<35, 0 otherwise.
0.12
Old
1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise.
0.40
Male
1 = male, 0 = female.
0.13
High School
Highest level of education in household? 1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise
0.09
Associates
1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise
0.31
Bachelors
1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise
0.17
Masters
1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise
0.08
Ph.D.
1 = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise
1.09
Household Size
Number of adults in household, other than the respondent.
0.10
Environmental Org.
Anyone in your household belong to an environmental organization? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
0.35
Med Income
1 if $35K/yr<Household Income<$75K/yr, 0 otherwise
0.32
High Income
1 if $75K/yr<Household Income, 0 otherwise
0.80
Employed
Adult with the highest income currently employed? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
0.12
Retired
Adult with the highest income currently retired? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
0.34
Short Cheap Talk
1 = received short cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise.
0.34
Longer Cheap Talk
1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise.
0.41
Sorting Required
1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise.
0.10
Polite
1 if polite refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise.
0.01
Angry
1 if angry refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise.
0.53
Landfill Visit
Has anyone in your household visited your community’s landfill? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
10.96
Landfill Distance
Distance to nearest landfill in miles.
Landfill Distance > 2
6.89
Distance above and beyond 2 miles to nearest landfill, 0 otherwise.
mi.
0.47
Hypothetical
1 = respondent valued a hypothetical CRP, 0 = otherwise.
84.24
Precision
On a scale of 0-100, how certain are you of the answers to your WTP questions?
0.98
English
Is English your first language? 1 = yes, 0 = no
0.50
Employer Recycle
Do you recycle at work? 1 = yes, 0 = no
0.78
Caucasian
What racial group best describes you? 1 = White or Caucasian, 0 otherwise
Hispanic
0.08
What racial group best describes you? 1 = Hispanic, 0 otherwise
0.03
African American
What racial group best describes you? 1 = Black or African American, 0 otherwise
0.38 Were you (or other adults in your house) raised in recycling households? 1 =yes, 0 = no
Generation Link
0.39
Neighbor Recycle
Do most of your neighbors currently recycle? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Years in Community 15.80
How many years have you lived in your community?
0.85
Number of Children
How many children under the age of 18 currently live in your home?
0.69
Attempt 1
Respondent available for survey after first dialing attempt.
0.14
Attempt 2
Respondent available for survey after second dialing attempt.
0.49 Respondent offer answer to how much household pays for current CRP? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Fee Known
4.54
Fee Difference
Stated CRP fee minus actual CRP fee.
0.89
CRP Performance
Job performance of your current CRP? 1 = excellent or good, 0 = fair or poor
5.51
Bid
Opening Bid 
Notes. The description does not always exactly match the wording in the survey instrument. To see the exact wording and
complete descriptive statistics for each variable, please refer to www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/datareport.pdf.
Further descriptions of the “Cheap Talk” variables can be found in Aadland and Caplan [2005]. In calculating the means,
the relevant sample size is N = 4012. However, due to the nature of some variables (e.g., Dropoff Distance and Primarily
Ethics) the mean is calculated using only the relevant subsample of respondents.
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Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models
Explanatory Variables†
Ethical Duty
Monetary
Primarily Ethics
Dropoff Distance
Dropoff User
Young
Old
Male
High School
Some College
Associates
Bachelors
Masters
Ph.D.
Household Size
Environmental Organization
Med Income
High Income
Employed
Retired
English
Caucasian
Hispanic
African American
Generational Link
Neighbors Recycle
Number of Children
Call Attempt #1
Call Attempt #2
Years in Community
Employer Recycle
Polite
Angry
Precision

DBDC WTP Estimates

Voluntary CRP
Participation
Probit Estimates

Mandatory/No CRP
Participation
Probit Estimates

Coefficient

P –Value

Coefficient

P –Value

Coefficient

P –Value

2.801***
0.289
1.147***
0.021
-0.040
1.503***
-0.220
-0.566***
0.470
0.607*
0.232
0.775**
0.782*
1.458***
0.087
1.305***
0.007
0.182
3.610**
0.136
0.770*
0.688***
0.202
0.052
0.180
-0.281
-0.048
-0.182
-0.477**
-0.020***
-0.017
-0.689***
-0.424
-0.013***

0.000
0.244
0.000
0.197
0.427
0.000
0.221
0.000
0.159
0.100
0.322
0.048
0.052
0.003
0.142
0.000
0.487
0.219
0.028
0.356
0.081
0.005
0.291
0.457
0.122
0.096
0.204
0.182
0.029
0.000
0.464
0.002
0.310
0.000

4.601***
1.113
1.265**
0.049
-0.333
-1.126**
-0.415
-0.407
-0.539
-0.383
0.253
0.253
0.703
-0.036
-0.023
1.148**
0.255
0.025
2.123**
2.046**
-1.836
-0.315
-1.133
0.982
0.377
--0.134
0.793**
0.412
-0.011
0.185
-0.742**
0.448
-0.003

0.002
0.188
0.012
0.182
0.245
0.011
0.270
0.110
0.360
0.399
0.435
0.432
0.323
0.491
0.451
0.022
0.307
0.482
0.012
0.019
0.175
0.293
0.112
0.216
0.148
--0.123
0.034
0.220
0.205
0.336
0.050
0.398
0.353

4.671***
-0.817
1.357***
0.061
-0.437
0.122
-0.883*
0.022
1.372
1.391
1.783*
1.987*
2.464**
2.300*
0.052
1.545***
0.107
0.376
0.288
1.417**
-2.254*
-0.652
-1.122*
-0.141
0.528*
---0.028
0.822**
0.708*
-0.010
0.924**
-0.913**
1.336
-0.008

0.000
0.211
0.005
0.126
0.171
0.393
0.084
0.472
0.130
0.126
0.080
0.053
0.027
0.043
0.378
0.004
0.406
0.222
0.347
0.049
0.079
0.118
0.091
0.448
0.058
--0.401
0.023
0.079
0.199
0.016
0.025
0.216
0.118

33

Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models (continued)
Fee Known
-0.512***
Fee Difference
0.070***
CRP Performance
1.339***
Sorting Required
-0.054
Landfill Visit
0.032
Landfill Distance
-1.750
Landfill Distance > 2 mi.
1.767
Short Cheap Talk
0.360**
Longer Cheap Talk
0.700***
CRP Community
-1.135***
Voluntary CRP Hypothetical Bias
--Mandatory CRP Hypothetical Bias
--No CRP Hypothetical Bias
---

Hetero.

0.007
0.000
0.000
0.386
0.428
0.115
0.113
0.018
0.000
0.000
-------

1.173***
-0.001
----0.463
1.135**
-1.208**
2.023**
2.737**
--2.306***
-----

0.002
0.482
----0.114
0.017
0.014
0.041
0.013
--0.006
-----

-------1.127***
0.125
1.206***
-1.317***
1.367**
2.515***
----2.720**
2.957***

------0.006
0.364
0.008
0.006
0.042
0.003
----0.040
0.000

Constant

1.797***

0.000

0.937***

0.066

2.106***

0.000

Bid

0.190***

0.000

0.373***

0.007

0.201**

0.027

Voluntary SP

-------

-------

2.013***

0.000

---

---

-----

-----

1.490**

0.011

Mandatory SP
No CRP SP

1.192***

0.003

Sample Size

4012

1168

2114

Likelihood Ratio Statistic

886.54***

226.25***

349.08***

Mean WTP

5.61

---

---

Calibrated Mean WTP

2.97

---

---

Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. The estimation was
carried out using the Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML 2.0) package in Gauss version 3.5. The nonlinear
optimization routine was Newton-Raphson with a convergence criterion of 1×10-5 for the gradient of the coefficients. The
estimates for the constant terms, community dummy variables, as well as the dummy variables for “don’t know” and
†
“missing responses” are not shown. Although not explicitly listed as an explanatory variable, we control for BID in creating
the probabilities that enter the likelihood function. See Cameron and James [1987] for further details.

34

Table 4. Calibrated WTP for Select Cities
City

CRP
Type

Raw WTP
Estimate

Tempe, AZ
Longmont, CO
Orem, UT
Wichita, KS
Fargo, ND
Abilene, TX
Palo Alto, CA
Escondido, CA
Peoria, AZ
Olathe, KS
Inglewood, CA
Newport Beach, CA

M
M
V
V
V
N
M
M
N
V
N
M

7.89
7.52
6.04
5.42
5.06
5.18
5.35
4.84
5.13
4.41
4.39
4.46

Hypothetical
bias
correction
-2.71
-2.71
-2.31
-2.31
-2.31
-2.96
-2.71
-2.71
-2.96
-2.31
-2.96
-2.71

Sample vs.
population
correction
-0.06
-0.05
+0.01
+0.12
+0.03
+0.04
-0.39
+0.02
-0.05
-0.11
+0.38
-0.35

Calibrated
WTP
Estimate
5.12
4.75
3.75
3.24
2.78
2.26
2.25
2.14
2.13
1.99
1.81
1.40

Notes: Mandatory and voluntary CRP cities were selected due to the availability of cost data. Three representative
non-CRP cities were chosen at random. The correction for differences between the sample and population
demographics includes the variables: gender, age, education, household size, income, primary language and race.
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Table 5. City Comparisons of Net Benefits and Theoretical CRP Predictions
Net Benefit CRP
City
WTP Cost
CRP Predictions
(WTP-Cost) Type
Tempe, AZ
5.12
1.62
3.50
M
CRP
Longmont, CO
4.75
3.03
1.72
M
CRP
Orem, UT
3.75
2.78
0.97
V
CRP
Wichita, KS
3.24
2.93a
0.31
V
CRP
Fargo, ND
2.78
2.68
0.10
V
CRP
Abilene, TX
2.26
2.93a
-0.67
N
No CRP
Peoria, AZ
2.13
2.93a
-0.70
N
No CRP
Escondido, CA
2.14
3.16
-1.02
Mb
No CRP
a
Inglewood, CA
1.81
2.93
-1.12
N
No CRP
Olathe, KS
1.99
3.58
-1.59
V
No CRP
b
Newport Beach, CA 1.40
3.42
-2.02
M
No CRP
Palo Alto, CA
2.25
5.10
-2.85
Mb
No CRP
Notes: (a) The overall mean cost estimate from Table 1. (b) Theoretical prediction does not account for
state-mandated recycling goals.
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